Abstract: This paper studies the structural differences between implicit and explicit government debt in a two-generations-overlapping model with stochastic factor-prices. If a government can issue safe bonds and new claims to wage-indexed social security to service a given initial obligation, there exists a set of Pareto-efficient ways to do so. This set is characterized by the conflicting interests of the current young and the yet unborn generations regarding the allocation of factor-price risks. However, it is shown that there will always exist a simple intertemporal compensation mechanism which allows to reconcile these conflicting interests. This compensation mechanism narrows the set of Pareto-efficient debt structures until only one remains. This result hinges on the double-incomplete markets structure of stochastic OLG models where households can neither trade consumption loans nor factor-price risks privately.
Introduction
Privatizing social security has often been described as a pure "shell game", where an implicit liability is replaced by an explicit liability of equal size.
2 From a different perspective, this equivalence between implicit and explicit government debt, may also be seen as a counterpart to the Modigliani-Miller Theorem in corporate finance. The underlying argument for this irrelevance result has its roots in the consumption loan nature of both debt instruments. A pure reallocation of resources between two adjacent cohorts can at most yield the biological interest rate.
3 For a deterministic economy, which is dynamically efficient in the sense of Diamond (1965) , bonds are issued with a rate of return that is, at first sight, superior to the biological return earned on social security contributions. However, to prevent an eventual default, the government has to collect a tax that exactly offsets this return advantage. Taking these taxes into account, both instruments yield identical allocations. 4 In particular, they reduce long-run utility by crowding-out capital. In stochastic overlapping generations models Enders and Lapan (1982) , Merton (1983) , Gordon and Varian (1988) , Gale (1990) , Krüger and Kubler (2005) and Gottardi and Kubler (2008) have shown that intergenerational transfers via PAYGO pension schemes and safe government debt may serve a second role. They allow to facilitate intergenerational risk sharing.
5 In-turn, these beneficial aspects of government debt have been scheme in an economy where fiat money is the only alternative store of value. Merton (1983) derives closed-form solutions for a three period OLG model with simultaneous demographic, TFP and income share risks. He shows that a tax and transfer system may replicate an (incomplete markets) equilibrium where agents can trade human capital freely. In the Merton (1983) setting such an intervention is always warranted as young agents would starve under "total market failure". Bohn (1998 Bohn ( , 2003 shows that a constant debt to GDP ratio leads to pro-cyclical debt issues, that amplify aggregate risks. Starting from a situation without government debt, Krüger and Kubler (2005) give numerical evidence that the introduction of unfunded social security is unlikely Pareto-improving − despite its risk sharing capacities − due to the crowding-out of capital. Gottardi and Kubler (2008) discuss the prospects of an ex-ante Pareto-improving introduction of unfunded social security in an economy with land. See Diamond (1977 Diamond ( , 2000 for a broader assessment of intergenerational and intragenerational insurance aspects of social security, and Shiller (1999) for more references on the sharing of aggregate risks. See Abel (2001) , Diamond and Geanakoplos (2003) , and Ball and Mankiw (2007) for different approaches to utilize trustfund assets − a question somewhat related to the present one. To focus firmly on the unfunded component of social security we will not introduce a trust-fund. Moreover, we leave-out ideosyncratic risks. As Bester (1984) and Abel (1989) show these risks can be insured within each cohort, i.e. they are not essential in the current context. compared to the negative long-run losses which stem from the crowding-out of capital. In particular Green (1977) , Krüger and Kubler (2005) and Gottardi and Kubler (2008) examine this trade-off between risk sharing and worsening factor-prices. Their analysis indicates that even the introduction of a very small social security system tends to decrease long-run utility. That is, the positive risk sharing effect is dominated by the negative crowding-out effect.
6
The current analysis complements this literature by taking a different perspective. We ask whether it is possible to restructure the vast debt which is already present in most countries in a Pareto-improving manner. Following this question, we show that it is possible to separate the crowding-out effect from the risk sharing problem. Changes in the composition of the public debt leave expected intergenerational transfers constant over time but alter the allocation of factor-price risks between different cohorts. Changes in the size of the debt change intergenerational transfers but tend to leave the allocation of factor-price risks unaltered. This separation of crowding-out and intergenerational risk sharing associated with public debt will in general allow the government to make a restructuring of the debt Pareto-improving.
To derive this result, we set up an initial value problem. Each member of an initial old generation holds claims from past pension promises and debt issues amounting to g 0 . The government can now raise a share λ of the revenue needed to service these claims through the introduction of a linear social security tax on the current young generations wage income. The remainder share 1 − λ has to be financed by selling safe debt. Finally, there is the group of yet unborn generations who have to service future pension claims issued to the current young generation.
There are two corollaries to the separation result sketched earlier: (i) if the government can only change the composition of the existing debt, there will be a set of efficient debt structures and another set of inefficient ones. The efficient set is characterized by the conflicting interests of those agents who are currently young and those who are yet unborn. The unborn generations benefit from the ex-ante diversification of their wage risk if a large share λ of the initial debt is injected into social security. The current young, who have already observed their wage income, on the contrary prefer safe debt, i.e. safe retirement benefits. (ii) if the government can also issue/recover additional bonds, i.e. change the size of the expected future intergenerational transfers, the set described in (i) can be narrowed to a Pareto-optimal debt structure, which maximizes societies (ex-ante) "Marshallian surplus" from intergenerational risk sharing. Put differently, the government can use its two instruments, i.e. the size and the composition of the debt, to steer the economy towards one point on the contract curve.
This second result appears to be of particular interest, when compared to the problem 6 Intuitively this result is plausible if we think of it in terms of the Finetti (1952) , Pratt (1964) , Arrow (1970) 
The crowding-out of capital induces first order welfare losses by lowering expected consumption µ ε . The risk sharing benefits, however, are only of second order. For the above approximation we have used the approximation σ
In this case, the lower consumption would be associated with a reduction in c 0 .
of optimal capital accumulation in a deterministic Diamond (1965) model. In analogy to our result (i), there always exists a set of efficient capital intensities. This means that every change in the capital intensity requires a welfare criterion as we can either shift resources into the future or redirect resources from the future towards current generations.
7
In the present stochastic setting, however, we show that it is possible to compensate intertemporally. We can shift resources and risks between the current young and the yet unborn members of society simultaneously and independently. As a consequence, the government can compensate intertemporally and narrow the set of efficient debt structures (without compensation) to the set of points on the contract curve (with compensation).
Regarding our assumptions, a notable aspect of our analysis is that we rule-out statecontingent lump-sum transfers. Following Merton (1983) , Gordon and Varian (1988) , Bohn (1998 Bohn ( , 2003 , Krüger and Kubler (2005) and Gottardi and Kubler (2008) we try to capture the basic features of most real-world pension and debt schemes by limiting the government debt instruments to safe bonds and a linear social security contribution rate on wages. We do so for two reasons: (i) while state-contingent lump-sum transfers may allow to reach better allocations than our simplistic debt instruments, they are not observed in actual policy. (ii) The optimal allocations which are derived for such statecontingent tax and transfer systems usually imply that the public debt follows a random walk as described in Gordon and Varian (1988) and Mankiw (2001, 2007) . Hence, if the government would actually implement these policies, it would default in finite time with probability one. One may therefore argue that such a risk sharing policy amplifies rather than dampens the small risks faced by each generation as they create a tremendous default risk.
Subsequently, in Section 2 we begin by laying out our model. The representative households, are assumed to maximize expected utility. Moreover, first and second period consumption are assumed to be normal goods. Savings can be invested in a risky and a safe production technology. Wages are determined according to a third risky technology. As in Diamond and Geanakoplos (2003) , it is assumed that aggregate investment does not affect marginal returns. This tri-linear setting will help us to bring out the underlying economic mechanisms more clearly.
9 In a different interpretation we may think of our model as a small open economy. Subsequently, the budget constraints of the social security system 7 The lack of such a compensation mechanism led to the turnpike literature, see, e.g., Samuelson (1968) or Blanchard and Fischer (1989) . The absence of such an intertemporal compensation mechanism is of course also the reason for the intertemporal efficiency of pay-go schemes that we have been referring to in Footnote 2.
8 Gordon and Varian (1988 ), p. 192, and Ball and Mankiw (2001 , 2007 (Proposition 2), point out that their debt schemes that reallocate risks "optimally" imply that per capita debt will follow a random walk. Hence per-capita debt will hit any boundary in finite time. Consequently, as Gordon and Varian (1988) , p. 192 point out, the economies total assets will eventually be negative, forcing the government to default at some point.
9 As the per capita size of expected intergenerational transfers will be kept constant over time we do not expect large changes in aggregate savings once implicit debt is replaced by explicit debt (cf. Diamond (1996) ). Hence the crowding-out effects along the neoclassical competitive factor-price-frontier, which are so notable when additional debt is issued, do not come into play in the current analysis. and the treasury are introduced. With the model in place, the two main results (i) and (ii) are derived in Section 2. In Section 3, we show that our results carry over once some of the restrictive assumptions made in Section 2 are relaxed. Namely, the assumption of a constant risk-free rate will be dropped. Moreover, we consider a defined benefit social security system, and briefly touch upon an economy with intra-cohort heterogeneity. Section 4 offers concluding remarks.
The Model
In this section we first introduce our assumptions regarding technology and preferences. Subsequently, we trace out the preferences of the current young and the yet unborn generations regarding the composition of the debt. Section 2.5 contains the key results on the separability of crowding-out and risk-sharing.
Population and factor-prices
The economy is inhabited by two-period-lived agents that form overlapping generations. During the first period of life each agent supplies one unit of labor inelastically. Population evolves according to:
where N t is the size of the cohort born in period t and 1 + n is the number of children raised by each member of cohort t. The wage rate w t and the interest rate to risky capital R t are both stochastic. They follow an exogenously given, serially i.i.d., distribution. The stochastic wage rate w t realized in period t has a lower boundw > 0. Risky investments have the limited liability property, i.e.Ř t −1. Furthermore the rate of return R t may be correlated with the wage rate w t , i.e. cov(w t , R t ) 0. In our baseline specification we assume that the safe rate r is exogenously given; respectively defined by a safe linear technology. In the sequel we also assume thatŘ < r < E[R], such that both risky and riskfree assets may be held by risk-avers investors. In Section 3, we relax the assumption of a constant riskfree rate.
Implicit and Explicit Government Debt
The government can interact with the competitive economy both via an unfunded payas-you-go social security system and through the intertemporal budget constraint of the treasury. While both of these schemes may be used to roll over debt, they differ with respect to the way that wage-income is taxed.
An unfunded social security system with a contribution rate τ s and per capita benefits p is characterized by its budget constraint:
Using the biological interest rate relation (1), constraint (2) can be rewritten, such that per capita pension benefits are given by:
Equation (3) indicates that an agent born in period t will contribute an amount τ s w t to the pension system in exchange for uncertain future benefits (1 + n)τ s t w t+1 . In terms of expectations, the consumption loan scheme will grow at rate n if the contribution rate is fixed. In this case, the per capita size of expected transfer remains constant:
The second channel through which the government can roll over debt is the treasury's budget constraint. Denoting the total amount of outstanding debt by B t , the amount of claims that are due in period t+1 by B t+1 and the treasury's tax rate by τ t t , the treasury's intertemporal budget constraint for period t is:
Defining debt per worker by b t ≡ Bt Nt and substituting (1) into (5) yields:
If no taxes were levied, per capita debt would grow at a proportional rate of
, from period t to period t + 1. To ensure that in per capita terms no additional debt is passed forward from generation t to generation t + 1, the treasury has to collect taxes from generation t amounting to:
Taxes are either positive or negative depending on whether the returns to intergenerational redistribution dominate market returns, i.e. if r n. 
The Structure of Government Debt
At the beginning of time there is an initial generation −1 of retirees and a generation 0 of workers. The generation of retirees holds per capita claims to an existing social security system and/or from past issues of government debt, amounting to g 0 . To service these claims the government has to raise a revenue of
from each member of generation 0. A 10 The taxes needed to keep per capita debt from growing to infinity, will be paid by the young consumers. However, as long as the representative agent invests into the riskfree technology, he will be indifferent between a tax of (rt+1−n) 1+rt+1 b when young or a tax of (r t+1 − n)b when old.
share λ ∈ [0, 1] of the needed revenue can now be raised via the initiation of an unfunded pension scheme with a defined contribution rate τ s :
The remainder share (1 − λ) can then be raised by issuing safe government bonds:
Recalling (7), per capita taxes in period 0 must satisfy:
Once we do not ask any future generation to redeem the debt, all subsequent generations will be taxed according to:
Inspection of (8) and (11) immediately yields the equivalence proposition that we have been referring to in the introduction.
12 In what follows, we drop the time index where no misunderstanding is expected.
The Optimum Structure for Government Debt
In this section we start by tracing out the preferences of the current young regarding the structure for government debt λ. Subsequently, we characterize the interests of the yet unborn generations. With these results at hand, the two main results are derived in Section 2.5. A representative member of cohort 0 can allocate his net income to first period consumption c 1 , invest an amount a 0 into the safe technology and devote h 0 to the risky technology:
11 Note that as with the explicit debt scheme, the amount resources transferred via social security may not permanently outpace the economy. At the same time lowering the contribution rate would amount to a repayment of some debt by the affected generation of retirees. To make both schemes feasible and comparable, we therefore fix τ s . 12 In the standard Diamond (1965) economy, the steady state budget constraint of the representative
(1 + n). Plugging the two budget constraints of the treasury (11) and the social security administration (8), with w 0 = w, into this budget constraint yields for the right-hand-side: w − r−n 1+r
(1+r)(1+n) . The life-cycle savings condition is also independent of λ:
Hence, changing the debt structure along the steady state, is irrelevant as it neither affects the household's budget constraint nor the life-cycle savings condition.
The corresponding first order conditions, which imply a * 0 and h * 0 , are:
If felicity, U () in (12), is such that first and second period consumption are normal goods we have:
Equipped with these conditions, the social planner can, disregarding the utility of subsequent generations for the moment, use the two debt instruments by choosing λ such that the indirect utility of generation 0 is maximized. Taking into account the budget constraints (8) and (10) yields the planning problem:
(8), (10).
Utilizing the envelope condition (13) and the covariance rule, λ * is implicitly defined by:
Condition (17), which is reminiscent of the C-CAPM, indicates that members of generation 0 will benefit from a high fraction of debt that is injected into the social security system as long as the expected excess rate-of-return on this fraction of debt, compared to the after-tax-return on safe bonds, is positive, i.e.
Ew−w 0 w 0 > 0. The other relevant component is the covariance between second period marginal utility and the pension benefit. Depending on cov(R 1 , w 1 ) 0, we have cov(U (c 2 ), w 1 ) |λ=0 0, i.e. the wage-indexed social security claims may or may not be a welcome opportunity to diversify stock market risks. 13 The increment in income from a high realization of w t is given by (1
14 Note that there is no life-cycle savings condition for bonds and capital in a small open economy, i.e. we only take note of the taxes that are needed to keep per capita debt from growing. In a closed economy with a tri-linear technology, we can also neglect the market clearing condition as long as agents demand safe investments in excess of the debt offered. In the following we assume that agents are equating at the margin, i.e. we omit the prospect of Kuhn-Tucker-type ramifications.
1) Subsequent Generations
The social planner's perspective on the welfare of subsequent generations, which is obviously connected to the current choice of λ, will be an ex-ante perspective. While the social planner knows the distribution over R and w, the realizations are yet unknown. The agents, however, will start to make their consumption savings decisions in period t after w t has been realized. The consumer's behavior is therefore still characterized by conditions (13) and (14) which imply the wage dependent investment decisions a t = a t (w t ; λ) and h t = h t (w t ; λ). Put differently, the social planner, who optimizes ex-ante utility, has to take note of the agent's investment decisions conditional on the realization of w t . Moreover, the budget constraints (8) and (11) have to be satisfied in each period. From the perspective of period 0, the planning problem is therefore given by:
The first order condition for an optimum debt structure, taking the envelope conditions (13) and (14) into account (see Appendix 5.1), is then given by:
Equation (19) characterizes the debt structure λ * * which maximizes long-run expected utility. Inspection of (19) indicates that agents who are not yet born will suffer a loss from excessive intergenerational redistribution if the safe returns exceed the biological returns on consumption loans. That is, the expected excess amount of resources − when compared to bonds which are not wage-indexed − that is redistributed via social security is given by
The second element is the intergenerational diversification of wageincome risk. With λ > 0 we have a positive social security tax rate τ s , which transfers some of the risk associated with the realization of w t into period t + 1, where w t+1 , i.e. the pension benefits are realized. The sufficient condition for an interior optimum requires that dV dλ is downward-sloping in λ. A first inspection of (19) suggests
< 0, and therefore
Hence, as we shift wage-income risk from the first into the second period, we expect the wage related covariance risk to move in the same direction (see Appendix 5.2 for the associated conditions). However, as the set of 15 Taking advantage of our assumption that the stochastic wage rate w t is serially uncorrelated we may rewrite cov wtwt+1R (U (c 2 ), . admissible debt structures is closed and bounded, there will always exist a "best" debt structure λ * * ∈ [0, 1]. The efficiency of the size of the debt scheme can be assessed once we ask whether the unborn generations benefit from a larger initial debt. Taking the first derivative of V t with respect to g 0 yields:
The first element in (20) is the familiar return condition; larger intergenerational reallocation of resources is desirable as long as consumption loans dominate market returns. The second element reflects the benefits from intergenerational risk sharing through the share λ of debt that is injected into the pension system. To see this more clearly, we recall (19) and rearrange (20) such that:
If λ is zero or at its long-run optimum λ * * , the second risk sharing related term vanishes and (21) exhibits the pure interest condition.
Furthermore, (21) indicates that safe debt does not reallocate risks, while social security does. This is the opposite of the Bohn (1998 Bohn ( , 2003 conclusion, where debt was issued pro-cyclical such that it shifted risks towards future generations. Equation (21) also shows that if the national debt is small, then this debt should be injected entirely into the pension scheme if dVt dλ , dV 0 dλ > 0, such that the benefits from risk sharing are maximized with λ = 1. In a different interpretation, the sign of (21) is the subject studied by Green (1977) , Krüger and Kubler (2005) and Gottardi and Kubler (2008) .
Efficiency
Inspection of our above analysis indicates that generation 0 will prefer a debt structure λ * , that is a solution to (17), rather than λ * * , which solves (19).
17 If the government can control the composition of the public debt only, all debt structures located between λ * and λ * * are Pareto-efficient. Raising λ beyond λ * will increase expected utility of all unborn generations at the expense of generation 0. Starting with λ * * , the same applies when λ is lowered. Hence, we have the following proposition: Proposition 1. If the government can only implement the debt structure that is used to roll over the initial debt, there exists a set [λ * , λ * * ] ⊆ [0, 1] of efficient financing methods.
This set is characterized by the conflicting interests of the current young and the yet unborn generations.
Diagrams 1a and 1b illustrate this trade-off. We now trace out the set of Pareto-improving
Diagram 1: Efficient debt structures. Diagrams 1a and 1b illustrate the gains and losses of generation 0 and one representative member of the yet unborn generations. All debt structures located in the dashed area are inefficient. Diagram 1b depicts a situation that may occur if E [w] w 0 and r n.
transitions from one debt scheme to another, which are available once the government can change both, the composition and the structure of the public debt. As we have stressed earlier, with these two instruments, it will be possible for the government to separate the risk sharing properties of the public debt from the crowding-out effect.
1) Efficiency with Government Intermediation
Suppose now that the initial conditions are such that λ = λ * < λ * * . In this case each member of the yet unborn generations is willing to accept a (slightly) higher level of public debt in exchange for a more favorable compositionλ > λ * of the debt. At the same time members of the current young generation are willing to accept additional pension claims and safe bonds in exchange for the less favorable allocation of factor-price risks associated withλ. The government can now offer generation 0 to increase the per-capita (in terms of generation −1) size of the public debt by π. The new debt scheme has a per-capita (of generation 0) size of
. The associated Lagrangian, which allows to trace-out the set of Pareto-improving pension reforms, is then given by:
Where the Lagrangian (22) consists of the indirect utility functions of the current young and the yet unborn generations which where discussed earlier in Section 2.4. The additional argument π in V 0 reflects that members of generation 0 receive additional safe consumption (after taxes) amounting to (1 − λ) 1 1+r π and additional pension claims λ π w 0 w 1 once the debt scheme is increased in size. The partial derivative ∂V 0 ∂π is therefore positive. Regarding future generations, we focus on the interesting case where resources are scarce and an increase per-capita debt alone is not Pareto-improving. That is, the partial derivative ∂Vt ∂g , described in (21), is assumed to be negative. Finally, as per-capita debt does not grow over time it is sufficient to represent future generations using only one lagrangian multiplier µ. Regarding the first order conditions associated with (22) we have:
Combining (23) and (24) we can drop the Lagrangian multiplier µ. The first order condition for the optimum structure for government debt λ * * * is then:
Condition (25) indicates that the optimum structure for government debt is associated with a point on the contract curve. It equalizes the marginal rates of substitution between the burden of an additional unit of debt and risk sharing benefits between current and future generations. By varying the size and composition of the debt it is possible to recover the efficiency gains displayed in Diagram 2 in a Pareto-improving manner. We therefore have the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If the government can vary both, the size of the public debt and its composition, it is possible to separate the crowding-out effect from the risk sharing properties of the public debt scheme. The efficiency gains associated with the optimum structure for government debt λ * * * can be recovered in a Pareto-improving manner.
Remark 1: The optimum structure for debt λ * * * may be at a corner solution. Remark 2: Different reference levelsV t for the utility of future generations will change the distribution of the efficiency gains brought about by the implementation of λ * * * . The associated income effects will slightly affect the location of λ * * * . Remark 3: If the initial debt structure is such that λ > λ * * * , some of the efficiency gains associated with the implementation of λ * * * can be passed forward to compensate the unborn generations. In this case, generation 0 gives up resources in exchange for lower labor income risk.
Diagram 2: Efficiency gains from intertemporal compensation. Diagrams 2a and 2b illustrate the compensation described in (25). In the case wherē U = U t (λ, g 0 ) all efficiency gains π − α accrue to Generation 0.
Remark 4: To keep in touch with the steady state as a reference point, Proposition 2 neglects the possibility of a repeated restructuring of the debt.
Remark 5: The golden rule of accumulation lends itself to the interpretation: maintaining a capital intensity that permanently exceeds the golden rule level is inefficient. In the present case we have a stronger result: maintaining any debt structure that permanently differs from λ * * * is inefficient.
2) Interpretation At this point it is interesting to compare the present result on the possibility of Pareto-improving social security reforms with the earlier negative results by Green (1977) , Krüger and Kubler (2005) , Gottardi and Kubler (2008) . In the case, where an initial debt is already present, a change in the composition of this debt reallocates factor-price risks but does not affect the size of the intergenerational transfer. By choosing λ * * * as a debt structure it is now possible to tailor a particular exchange of risks and resources such that it is beneficial to both groups of agents. Namely, those living in the "long-run" and those who live today. Diagram 3 illustrates this. Curve 1 represents the long-run consequences of a linear social security tax. As this tax increases, the economy moves from the origin to a certain point e.g. K. Curve 2, which is steeper than 1, shows the threshold where future generations are indifferent between the crowding-out of capital and the risk sharing benefits. Finally, point C is an allocation that can be reached in the manner described above: a change in the composition of the debt reallocates many risks via the linear social security tax. The change in the allocation of resources is mainly due to the change in the size of the debt π. Put differently, by introducing a linear social security tax alone the government can only move along arrow 1. If there is already an Diagram 3: Separation of crowding-out and risk sharing A linear social security tax 1 implies a combination of crowding-out and intergenerational reallocation of factor-price risks. Introducing a particular social security tax moves the economy from the origin to point K. Line 2 indicates the minimum reallocation of risks necessary to compensate future generations for the negative crowding-out effect. In the present case the government has two instruments available. It can therefore move freely in the risk-resource plane and implement the optimal allocation C.
initial debt present it has two linearly independent instruments. In this case it can move in the entire plane, where point C is associated with an optimal pair λ * * * , π * * * .
3) Another Interpretation In a different interpretation (25) may be seen as an intertemporal version of the Samuelson (1954) condition for the efficient provision of a public good. Recalling equation (21) we can rewrite (25) such that:
18 For r > n, we have (25) is the marginal rate of substitution between an increase in λ and and increase of the debt level of one unit. The new formulation in (26) is the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between a marginal increase of λ and a marginal increase in the tax level.
Condition (26) indicates that all future generations benefit from the public good "risk sharing" which is embodied in the debt scheme. The cost with the provision of this public good has to be incurred only once by generation 0, which bears additional wage-related risk. Depending on its position on the time axis, the present value of tax payments differs from cohort to cohort.
in the numerator of the marginal rate of substitution of future generations indicates the negative crowding-out effect. The second element λ g ∂Vt ∂λ is positive. As a share λ of the new debt π is injected into social security. This increases the willingness of future generations to accept a higher level of public debt.
The analogy to the problem of public good provision also extends to the aspect of income effects. Changing levels ofV t will require different compensation schemes. Hence, the exact location of λ * * * depends on the particular compensation scheme as the associated income effects may slightly change preferences for λ, i.e. shift the marginal cost and benefit curves displayed in Diagram 2.
Extensions
So far attention was confined to an economy where the safe rate-of-return is constant over time. The prospects of a third debt instrument, namely a defined benefit social security system, have also been neglected. In a first step, we now show that a time-varying, safe rate-of-return does not alter the quality of the foregoing conclusions and that defined benefits are equivalent to safe bonds. Finally a second group of representative agents who do not invest in the stock market (risky technology) is introduced into our model. In this setting we show that both groups require different social security contribution rates, i.e. debt structures. If either is at a corner solution there is additional scope for an intragenerational reallocation of the public debt.
Time-Varying Safe Returns
To work out the pivotal elements, the safe rate of return was assumed to remain constant over time. However, the main results of our previous analysis carry over to an economy where r is now an i.i.d. random variable. Regarding generation 0, nothing is changed, i.e. the agents and the social planner start maximizing after r 1 is known. Except for the additional expectations regarding r the long-run planning problem (19) is also little changed:
Employing the envelope conditions (13) and (14), yields:
Due to the nature of the treasury's tax schedule (11), the initial interest rate r 1 does not, unlike the wage rate w 0 , enter into the long-run first order condition. While there are now additional expectations regarding the safe rate-of-return, the principal structure of the first order condition is preserved. Regarding our Pareto-improving interventions that were discussed in Section 2.5, we note that the government can still reallocate gains and losses along its budget constraint. However, each compensation scheme will now require some sort of risk-taking.
Defined Benefits
We will now briefly show that a defined benefit system is equivalent to an explicit debt scheme. The budget constraint of a defined benefit system, which is used to roll over a fraction γ of the public debt, is given by:
Once we recall that the young agent can consume c 1 , invest an amount a into safe assets and an amount h into risky assets, the present value budget constraint is given by:
Utilizing (28) and (11) where (1 − λ) is replaced by (1 − γ), the right-hand side of (29) can now be rewritten such that:
Hence the structure of debt γ is irrelevant, i.e. a defined benefit system is equivalent to a bond-financed debt scheme.
A Working Class
This final paragraph considers a society that is partitioned into a group of capitalists who are endowed with a large amount of efficient labor and a group of workers with a low labor endowment. While capitalists participate in the stock-market, workers invest in the safe technology only. 19, 20 The working class is assumed to make up a fraction α of the population and each worker has only a fraction φ of the effective labor endowment of a capitalist. Hence, workers earn a fraction θ = αφ 1+α(φ−1) of aggregate wages. Consequently, with a linear social security tax, the debt rolled over on the shoulders of workers and capitalists is given by g . Workers will now choose safe investment according to (13) . The optimal shares of debt for the working class, λ * w , λ * * w are then characterized by (17) and (19), with the notable difference that h = 0. θ is not large enough to transport a sufficient amount of wage-related risk into the retirement period, we have λ * * * w > 1 and hence,
Once λ * * * c < 1, bonds from the capitalists' debt scheme can be injected into the workers' pension scheme. If the capitalists, in turn, pay the implicit tax associated with this debt swap as a subsidy to the workers, the marginal increase in rent for workers is, recalling equations (21)- (25) with λ w = 1, given by:
Thus, while utility of the capitalists remains constant, the utility of workers has increased. To a certain extent this result illustrates the main point of our analysis. Given that we already have incurred the debt, the risk sharing capacities of the debt are a scarce resource. Transferring some of the debt from capitalists to workers improves risk sharing without any additional crowding-out of capital.
Conclusion
If a government can issue safe bonds and claims to an unfunded social security system to service a given obligation, there exists a set of Pareto-efficient financing policies. This set is characterized by the conflicting interests of agents who are currently alive and those who are yet unborn. The current young, who have already observed their wage income, will prefer safe debt, i.e. safe retirement benefits. The unborn generations on the contrary
Diagram 4: Intragenerational reallocation of the debt.
The shaded area to the right of λ = 1 is the welfare gain associated with an intragenerational debt swap.
benefit from the ex-ante diversification of their wage risk if a large portion of the initial debt is injected into social security. The government may now act as a representative of the unborn members of society. Through its budget constraint, it can offer generation 0 a compensation that reflects the willingness to pay of all unborn agents. Such an intermediation allows to collect the benefits, which are associated with the optimum structure for government debt λ * * * in a Pareto-improving manner. If the initial conditions are such that λ * * * > 0, an unfunded social security system is therefore always warranted.
Unlike the deterministic economy, where all debt policies are equally desirable, the current analysis shows that the structure of government debt has distinct implications for individual welfare. If we compare our analysis to the problem of optimal capital accumulation, the following analogy is notable: While the golden rule capital intensity maximizes long-run utility, it comes at the cost of lower consumption along the transition path. All capital intensities below the golden rule level are therefore efficient and there is no compensation mechanism available.
22 Compared to the reallocation of aggregate risks, the situation without compensation is similar; there exists a whole set of efficient debt structures. In the present case, however, the government budget constraint can be used to reconcile the conflicting interests of the current young and those who live in the long run in a Pareto-improving manner. As a result, subject to our assumptions, the set of efficient debt structures can be narrowed.
Appendix

The Envelope Conditions
Derivation of condition (19): Equations (13) and (14) imply an investment behavior for each realization of the wage-income w t , namely a t = a t (w t , λ), h t = h t (w t , λ). Hence, agents smooth consumption state by state with regard to first period wage income. At the same time, they smooth consumption in expectations when it comes to second period consumption. Taking expectations E wt of (13) and (14) yields:
Writing out the first order condition for λ * * , we obtain:
To rearrange the first line in (34), equation (32) are functions of w t , the second line can be rearranged using the covariance rule such that:
That is, recalling (13), (14), (32), and (33), the expressions related to changes in the investment behavior vanish by the envelope theorem.
Characteristics of the Long-run Optimum
This appendix examines the properties of condition (19) . In a first step we note that (19) characterizes a "best" debt structure, which may or may not be interior. In a next step it is shown that interior solutions will exist for appropriate parameters. Finally the conditions, which ensure that dVt(λ) dλ |λ=0
> 0 and that d 2 Vt(λ) dλ 2 < 0, are outlined.
1) Existence
Since short sales of bonds or social security claims were ruled out, the set of feasible debt structures [0, 1] is a compact subset of R. If V t (λ) is continuous and real-valued, it will therefore attain its bounds on this choice set according to the Weierstrass theorem. are continuous and dh dτ s < 0, it is obvious that for sufficiently large g 0 , sufficiently small cov(R, w t+1 ), and E w [w] = w 0 or r = n, we have:
2) Interior Solutions If
In this case, there exists one interior global optimum λ * * and there may exist several local optima.
− dcov wt (U (c 1 ),
A first inspection of (38) indicates that for Ew = w 0 and/or r = n, we expect 
where (40) is negative if ∂h ∂τ cov(R, w t+1 ) + (1 + n)σ 2 w > 0. If cov(R, w t+1 ) is large and positive and the share of savings invested in the risky technology is also very large, the crowding-out effect (with regard to risky investment) of additional pension claims may in principle overcompensate the direct effect of the exposition to additional wage-related risks once λ is increased. 
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